Strategic and Operational Polymorphism in War

The United States operates according to a guiding strategic conflict doctrine known as “Full Spectrum Warfare.” (FSW)

Dominance in one domain of warfare provides a given set of advantages while dominance in multiple domains of warfare simultaneously provides new kinds of synergistic advantages that amplify each other in new and incredible ways.

Just as complete air superiority provides resounding advantages, combining it with advanced reconnaissance and naval supremacy provides a new set of advantages that interact with and amplify each other.

FSW goes further. It demands not merely supremacy in a few domains of warfare but in every domain simultaneously. It is a practically impossible task, but one which makes us stronger and more effective just for attempting it.

Today we will discuss what have been some of the largest challenges to a proper implementation of FSW, why these problems happen, and how they can be resolved.

To be maximally effective, FSW must be extremely polymorphic. This is because it is simply not possible to actually ensure dominance in every domain simultaneously from the start of the war. When properly practiced FSW is not some delusion that all facets of our Military are superior to all those of every other Military on Earth. Rather, it serves as an ideal form to achieve.

If we can’t foster our Military to a state of simultaneous all domain supremacy now, we must be prepared to utilize what advantages we do possess to destroy those of the enemy such that through battlefield action we achieve the desired state of supremacy in every domain. This is where polymorphism comes in, and it’s one of the biggest weaknesses in the implementation of FSW in the real world.

If the enemy has a force at sea capable of contesting ours, we leverage dominance in air power and surveillance to counteract and ultimately destroy that advantage. Then, having unlocked the tool of Naval supremacy, we may leverage it to support a shore landing that destroys forward SAM sites and radar installations to sustain our advantage in the skies.

Tactically modern US forces are superbly flexible. Operationally and Strategically, however, there can be a great degree of rigidity to American war-planning. This is not exclusively the fault of the Officers involved, as Military strategy is often “built strategy.” It can take years or decades for systems to come to fruition and proliferate throughout the armed forces. When you have a hammer you treat every problem like a nail.

To be truly adaptive, to foster these polymorphic threat environments that will give us the leverage to create that state of Full Spectrum Dominance which does not at the start of a war exist, we must reformat our logistics chain to support flexible decision making.

Production of key Military assets must be set up in such a way that the industries tied to every domain are idling at a level at least slightly above our anticipated needs. The reason for this is what we have seen in the Ukraine War and both World Wars. It can not always be predicted what systems will be vital in future conflicts or to what degree. In all three wars we massively underestimated the need for artillery shells and in the most recent one our capability to replenish the kinds of long range missile systems that are in high demand has proven lacking. Spinning those capabilities up has proven to be a multi years long process that we simply could not afford during actual wartime.

Today our military budget is dramatically lopsided, investing heavily in capabilities that have essentially been grandfathered in. The Pentagon has repeatedly begged to be allowed to stop buying quite so many tanks, for example, so it can spend the money on more transformative programs. Yet, Congress has constantly refused. It isn’t that there’s not enough money, but that Military leaders aren’t being given the discretion to spend that money in the ways that will actually help them achieve maximum flexibility and resilience at war.

A leader can only properly execute FSW if they have the wiggle room to be strategically and operationally polymorphic, adapting to threats and reformulating plans in real time. To do so requires extreme flexibility in the kinds of systems and capabilities they have access to and for those to be present in sufficient volumes to execute their plans.

If even just a small part of the money we spend on building tanks that are already stockpiled to the gills could be spent on improving our output of 155mm shells and ATACMS missiles it would provide far greater strategic flexibility during any future sustained conflict. Now imagine, if you will, cutting down to size not just the tank budget but all the wasteful and archaic programs. Imagine spending that money not just on improving sustainment of existing under-resourced capabilities but fostering new ones as well.

Droneswarms, CUAS, and advanced cyber capabilities. These are just a few of the areas where we absolutely must achieve a higher degree of flexibility. It’s not solely about leveraging them as potential building blocks for properly executing FSW but, crucially, for ensuring the enemy can not leverage them for that purpose.

We must have the ability to rapidly execute optimal threat patterns formulated through an adaptive understanding of the disposition of enemy forces and battle-plans in a given war, but also to quickly and effectively respond to those presented by the enemy.

Part of the blame for the failure to implement FSW at the Strategic and Operational levels rests on the shoulders of top Military leadership, but part of it falls to us.

By allowing rogue politicians to dictate Military spending powers we have entrenched corruption and waste into the very foundations of our National Defense establishment. Congress must refrain from providing overly specific dictations on how funds are to be used unless specific problems develop, leaving the Pentagon free to retool the Military Industrial Complex to best suit its needs at any given moment.

Neither Congress or the Military Industrial Complex would think much of this plan. In fact, both of them can be counted on to oppose it with incredible tenacity. Congresspeople often award contracts to give jobs to their constituents, and the MIC just doesn’t want to break out into new ventures if it doesn’t have to.

For Politicians and executives alike, it’s much better if we keep making the same old things in the same old factories and for us to keep paying ever inflating costs for the privilege of doing so. To be sure, I would not say we should shut most of those factories down. After all, to do so would be to impair the very flexibility this article calls for.

What I am suggesting is that we would be better off allocating a large portion of those resources elsewhere while retaining the capability to scale production as needed to address future requirements.

The idea of an unlimited Military budget is a myth. We must think not just about how to allocate our funds to meet the needs of today, but also how to give leaders the flexibility they need to shift that production to meet the rapidly adapting needs of future warfare.

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